For us, truth is what is reliable and known. Truth is therefore also linked to the pursuit of knowledge and therefore also to freedom. Democracy requires a common reference to reality - but the state is not available as an authority for the possession of truth. Fundamental rights, in particular academic freedom, are needed to guarantee the search for truth and its protection.
What is truth?
The scene described in the 18th chapter of the Gospel of John is, if we follow the constitutional lawyer Hans Kelsen, one of the greatest things that world literature has produced. Accused of political sedition, Jesus stands accused before Pontius Pilate, the Roman governor in Jerusalem. Pilate responds to the accused's statement that he had come into the world as a king to bear witness to the truth with the counter-question that became a household name after him: "What is truth?" The point of the story, however, is that he turns to the people and organises a vote which, as we know, turns out unfavourably for Jesus because the majority demands the release of Barabbas, who is said to be a robber. In other words, the entire production is a lesson in populism. Even if it is quickly agreed that one cannot vote on the truth, the question remains as to what this means for democracy and its interest in the truth.
But is the interest in truth at all identical with the Pilate question? This is already either the result of a sceptical attitude or, as it seems, the expression of cowardice in the face of decision-making, ultimately even just a phrase in the cynical game for power. Be that as it may! The question of what the truth is is always asked when the understanding of truth has already become a problem. What meaning do we associate with truth and what interest do we have in it? In other words, why should there be any truth at all? The original question of truth initially arises from very elementary and existential needs, because we have the greatest interest in an answer to the question of what we can reliably know about ourselves and the world. A first answer is therefore: anyone who asks for the truth is interested in behaving in a way that is in line with reality in order to be able to orientate themselves in the reality of their lives. The effect of truth is therefore in question: what is reliably known and therefore familiar to us is true.
Knowing is better than not knowing
But truth can only be what is reliable because it is true! For the person who asks Pilate's question, reliability and validity have diverged. So questions about the validity of what is supposed to be reliable for us become central to the dispute about truth. After all, it is clear that only proof of the validity of truth can guarantee its reliability. Only then are we prepared to rely on something, precisely because it is valid. What is true is in turn decided on the basis of the reasons with which we can justify our knowledge of the truth.
The interest in truth therefore serves a fundamental orientation towards the value of knowledge: knowledge is better than ignorance. But why should there be knowledge at all and why do we seek knowledge? The answer can only be that we have an interest in the liberating effect of knowledge. Put another way: Truth should be for the sake of freedom! We can only lead a self-determined life if we are able to orientate ourselves in reality. To do this, however, we need the certainty that knowledge does not deceive us. Because only knowledge creates a connection to reality so that it becomes concrete and verifiable for us. Valid knowledge is the prerequisite for a true orientation towards the world and life. In other words: Truth establishes the reliability of our orientation in the world. Because truth should serve freedom, we put knowledge at the service of enlightenment and emancipation.
Truth in liberal democracy
Against this background, it is also possible to give an initial indication of the importance of truth for liberal democracy. In a nutshell, it is an order of freedom that aims to create space for different world views and plural interests. It also promises that people do not have to live their lives determined by others, but can help shape their living conditions through political participation. However, this requires all citizens - for the sake of their equal freedom - to agree on the world in which they want to live together. Democracy needs a common reference to reality that provides us with information about the natural and social conditions in which we live and which need to be shaped. It goes without saying that this is not a question of harmonised opinions, but of shared basic assumptions about what is considered fact, which sources are trustworthy and how evidence is evaluated. It is precisely when the foundations of what is considered "real" are disputed that democratic decision-making depends on trusting in the power of arguments and the willingness to weigh things up in processes of deliberation and decision-making. Because the reliability of our knowledge about reality represents both an individual and a common good, democracies organise such processes of understanding in such a way that free consent to the knowledge of society is made possible.
However, since democracy thrives on the discourse of different convictions, a governmental codification of "truth" would stifle the democratic battle of opinions. Consequently, the state must not act as an authority on truth and decree what is true. The constitutional order of a liberal democracy does not establish an order of truth, but an order of freedom. For the sake of freedom, the state must limit itself to protecting the social communication spaces in which the dispute over the truth is conducted. However, it is essential that the state protects the freedom to seek the truth without being able to enforce certain truth claims with the force of law. Article 5 of the Basic Law therefore summarises those fundamental rights that are intended to enable and protect the search for truth: Freedom of opinion, freedom of the press, freedom of information - and freedom of science.
The freedom of science and its endeavour for truth as an interest of a liberal democracy
When a sentence from the 8th chapter of the Gospel of John is emblazoned in golden letters above the entrance portal of the University of Freiburg as a motto, then it is associated with a validity that primarily has a non-religious meaning: "The truth will set you free!" Even if such pathos sounds old-fashioned to today's ears, the search and pursuit of truth is one of the essential tasks of a university. This has to do with the fact that in modern societies, the relevant understanding of the world should take place in a scientific manner. This insight can certainly be derived from the reflections on the basic understanding of truth in its dialectic of reliability and validity of our knowledge of reality. Science, which is primarily pursued at universities, assumes the function of a socially recognised authority for interpreting reality because it provides methodically controlled and intersubjectively comprehensible findings. It thus fulfils the requirements of rational justifiability and verifiable knowledge, which are fundamental to socially shared true knowledge. This is also the view of the Federal Constitutional Court, which defines the freedom of science as the "serious and systematic endeavour for truth in terms of content and form" (BVerfGE 35, 79 [113]).
Seen in this light, the fundamental right to academic freedom protects the university as a place of truth-seeking and institutionally safeguards this independence. Such autonomy is of fundamental importance for liberal democracy. On the one hand, civil societies cannot do without knowledge of the truth for the reasons mentioned above. On the other hand, however, the state is not available as an authority for the possession of truth. Consequently, liberal democracy is dependent on the methodically controlled and open-ended process of searching for the truth being guaranteed at a level of protection with constitutional status: academic freedom must be guaranteed if there is to be freedom in our society!
Article by Georg Essen, Professor of Systematic Theology at the Central Institute for Catholic Theology at Humboldt-Universit?t zu Berlin.